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Abstract 
This essay argues that the complete harmonisation of transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length 
principle is unattainable for three reasons. First, states are not under a legal obligation to apply 
the principle outside of treaty or domestic law. Second, the theoretical shortcomings of the 
principle are creating a divergence from the OECD guidelines on how the principle should be 
applied. Third, the perception held by states that multinational enterprises are not paying a fair 
share of tax is also creating a divergence from the OECD guidelines on the principle. The resultant 
divergence is a significant obstacle to transfer pricing harmonisation.  
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The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
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I Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises 
A Introduction 
Transfer pricing is an international tax issue that has grown in 
importance with the rise of global trading by multinational 
enterprises. 1  Transfer pricing refers to the price at which goods, 5 
services and intellectual property are charged between related parties 
in cross-border arrangements.2 For example, suppose that the parent 
company of a multinational pharmaceutical group is incorporated in 
the United Kingdom. In order to manufacture a drug for distribution in 
the United Kingdom, the parent company wishes to acquire a generic 10 
drug from a subsidiary of the group incorporated in Canada. The 
transfer price is the amount that the United Kingdom parent company 
pays to acquire the drug from the Canadian subsidiary. 
The structure of multinationals and the accompanying risks of 
transfer pricing manipulation present particular difficulties for tax 15 
authorities. The main difficulty is in determining how to allocate the 
income and expenses of a company in one jurisdiction that is part of a 
multinational group operating across several jurisdictions. A second 
and related difficulty is how to balance the right to tax the profits of a 
company arising from within an authority’s jurisdiction, with the need 20 
to avoid the same profits being taxed again by another tax authority in 
a different jurisdiction. In order to address these difficulties, tax 
authorities around the world apply the separate entity approach to the 
taxation of multinational enterprises. Despite the high level of 
integration within a multinational, each constituent part of a 25 
multinational group is treated as a separate entity by the relevant tax 
authority and taxed according to source or residence rules. In broad 
terms, the approach ensures that the profits generated by a 
multinational subsidiary within a particular jurisdiction are taxable by 
that jurisdiction’s authorities. In the absence of such an approach, 30 
multinationals could simply avoid a state’s tax jurisdiction by shifting 
their taxable profits offshore. 
                                               
1  Jamie Elliot and Clive Emmanuel “International Transfer Pricing” in 
Andrew Lymer and John Hasseldine (eds) The International Taxation 
System (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2002) 157 at 158. 
2  Elliot and Emmanuel, above n 1, at 157. 
2 
Since the 1970s, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has publicly promulgated the arm’s length 
principle as a means of applying the separate entity approach to 
multinational enterprises. The arm’s length principle eliminates the 
special conditions that exist between groups within a multinational 5 
structure. The principle requires that the prices or profits from a 
controlled transaction between the related parts of a multinational 
group be similar to the prices or profits from an uncontrolled 
transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances. 
Independent parties are subject to ordinary market forces. 10 
Transactions between independent parties therefore provide a 
benchmark to assess whether transactions between related parties were 
carried out at arm’s length. 
The thesis of this essay is that the complete harmonisation of 
transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length principle is unattainable.  15 
The essay explores the hypothesis in three ways. First, Part II 
shows that the harmonisation of transfer pricing rules depends on the 
application of both the arm’s length principle and the OECD guidelines 
on the interpretation of the principle. Second, Part III explores how 
transfer pricing rules are diverging from the arm’s length principle in 20 
the OECD framework. The part shows that OECD member countries are 
free to develop domestic transfer pricing laws that are at odds with 
OECD policy. The part uses the transfer pricing laws in Australia and 
the United States to demonstrate the divergence. Third, Part IV 
analyses why prominent OECD member states are diverging from OECD 25 
transfer pricing policy. 
Part IV uncovers three reasons behind the divergence. First, 
the principle and the guidelines do not have any legal effect until they 
have been incorporated into domestic law or treaty law. The lack of 
any binding legal effect outside of domestic or treaty law is a 30 
significant obstacle to transfer pricing harmonisation. Second, the 
arm’s length principle has theoretical shortcomings. The shortcomings 
are being overcome by the use of arm’s length methods in ways that 
diverge from OECD policy. Third, there exists a perception among 
governments that multinational enterprises are not paying an 35 
appropriate amount of tax. Governments are diverging from OECD 
policy in order to exact what they believe to be a fairer tax revenue 
return from multinational activities. Each of the three reasons for 
3 
divergence is a significant obstacle to the harmonisation of transfer 
pricing rules. Part V concludes that the complete harmonisation of 
transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length principle is unattainable. 
B Global Context and Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
The transfer pricing problem accompanied the rise of 5 
multinational trading in the aftermath of World War II. 3  The 
expansion of multinational trading has not slowed since. According to 
the OECD around 60 per cent of world trade takes place within 
multinational enterprises. 4  Multinationals operate in a marketplace 
where jurisdictional boundaries are no obstacle to trade. Typically, 10 
multinationals conduct their business by establishing a variety of legal 
structures in the countries from which they operate. These structures 
can take the form of subsidiaries, branches, joint ventures or 
partnerships; but the group is usually controlled by a parent company 
or partner in a single country. 5  Transactions that occur between 15 
separate or related parts of a multinational are not necessarily subject 
to the same economic or market forces that shape the dealings 
between independent parties in a similar transaction. The different 
parts of a multinational do not transact with each other on an 
uncontrolled open market. Rather, they transact within a controlled 20 
multinational structure.6 
Multinationals can use their structure to manipulate transfer 
prices, exploit avoidance opportunities and shift profits to countries 
where the corporate tax rate is lower.7 Essentially, multinationals may 
manage their transfer pricing in order to arbitrage differences between 25 
national tax rates.8 The arbitrage can be done in two ways. First, a 
multinational subsidiary may charge an artificially low price when 
selling a good or service to a related subsidiary in a low tax 
jurisdiction. The seller earns lower profits, and therefore pays less tax. 
Second, a multinational subsidiary may charge an artificially high 30 
price when selling a good or service to a related subsidiary in a high 
                                               
3  Stanley Langbein “The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s 
Length” (1986) 30 Tax Notes 625 at 642. 
4  OECD OECD Insights Debate the Issues: Price fixing (March 2012) 
<www.oecdinsights.org>. 
5  Terry Thompson “Canada’s Transfer Pricing Laws” (1998) 11 
Transnat’l Law 311 at 315. 
6  Thompson, above n 5, at 316. 
7  Elliot and Emmanuel, above n 1, at 159. 
8  Elliot and Emmanuel, above n 1, at 159. 
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tax jurisdiction. The buyer earns lower profits, and therefore pays less 
tax. Although profits are lower in each case for one of the subsidiaries, 
the overall after-tax profits of the whole multinational group increase. 
The multinational, when viewed as a single economic entity, is better 
off. The transfer price shifts a multinational’s profits from a subsidiary 5 
in a high tax jurisdiction to a subsidiary in a low one. 
II The OECD Response: the Arm’s Length Principle 
and the OECD Guidelines 
Part II analyses the policy framework that the OECD 
promulgates in order to tax multinational enterprises, reduce the risks 10 
of double taxation, and combat transfer pricing manipulation. The part 
assesses the extent to which the arm’s length principle and other OECD 
transfer pricing policies have affected domestic legislation in different 
states. 
A  The OECD Transfer Pricing Policy Framework 15 
The arm’s length principle is promulgated by the OECD 
through a combination of bilateral agreements and other OECD 
documents. Together the agreements and documents form a policy 
framework to address transfer pricing. At the centre of the framework 
is the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.9 The 20 
model convention provides a uniform solution to the problem of 
international double taxation among OECD members. It is accompanied 
by a commentary that informs the interpretation of the model 
provisions. Since the first OECD draft model convention in 1963, an 
increasing number of member states have concluded bilateral tax 25 
treaties that follow the model provisions. The Council of the OECD 
specifically urges this course of action on members in order to achieve 
the harmonisation of principles, rules and interpretation in matters of 
double taxation.10 
                                               
9  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and in Capital (OECD, Paris, 
2010). 
10  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (July 2010) at 20. 
5 
Article 9(1) of the model convention is the authoritative 
statement of the arm’s length principle in cross-border transactions11 
and provides that:12 
Where 
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly 5 
or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 10 
Contracting State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 15 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason 
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the 
profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 
Neither art 9(1) nor any other provision in the model 
convention provides a way of determining whether a transfer price is 20 
consistent with the arm’s length principle. Therefore, in addition to 
commentaries, the OECD publishes comprehensive guidelines on the 
application and interpretation of art 9(1). The guidelines are intended 
to harmonise the application of the arm’s length principle by member 
states.13 The OECD recommends that member states’ domestic transfer 25 
pricing rules should align with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
The OECD regularly publishes updated versions of the guidelines in 
order to reflect the changing consensus from member states as to how 
the arm’s length principle should be applied. This essay focuses on the 
2010 version of the guidelines. 14  The 2010 version provides five 30 
methods that tax authorities should use in order to show that transfer 
prices accord with the arm’s length principle.15 In general terms the 
methods require that the “price or profits arising from a related party 
                                               
11  Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, above n 9, at C(9)-
1. 
12  Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, above n 9, at art 
9(1). 
13  Jose Calderon “The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a Source of 
Tax Law: Is Globalisation reaching the Tax Law?” (2007) 35 IT Rev 4 
at 9. 
14  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (July 2010). 
15  See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 59–103. 
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arrangement (a controlled transaction) be compared to the price or 
profits arising in an arrangement between unrelated parties (an 
uncontrolled transaction).” 16  Three of the methods, the traditional 
transaction methods, are regarded as the most direct means of 
establishing an arm’s length price as they compare a controlled 5 
transaction to the price that would have been paid in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction between independent parties. The traditional 
transactional methods are the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
the resale price method, and the cost plus method. 
1  Traditional transactional methods 10 
The comparable uncontrolled price method is the preferred 
method if it is possible to locate data from comparable uncontrolled 
transactions.17 The price in a comparable uncontrolled transaction is 
substituted into the price used by the parties in their controlled 
transaction in order to create arm’s length conditions. 15 
The resale price method is slightly different. The method starts 
with the price at which a product has been purchased from an 
associated enterprise in a controlled transaction, and then compares 
that purchase price to the price at which that product is resold to an 
independent enterprise.18 In order to arrive at an arm’s length price the 20 
resale method reduces the resale price by a margin that reflects the 
amount of profit that the reseller could appropriately expect based on 
its costs, assets and risks.19 The price remaining after the margin has 
been subtracted is the arm’s length price for the original transfer 
between the associated enterprises.20 25 
The last of the traditional transactional methods is the cost 
plus method. The cost plus method takes the costs incurred by the 
supplier in a controlled transaction and adds a mark-up to reflect the 
appropriate amount of profit that the supplier should earn on the basis 
of the functions of the supplier and the market conditions in which it 30 
operates.21 The arm’s length price of the original transaction is arrived 
                                               
16  Julie Harrison and Mark Keating “New Zealand’s General Anti-
Avoidance Provisions: A Domestic Transfer Pricing Regime by 
Proxy?” (2011) 17 NZ J Tax & Policy 419 at 422. 
17  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 63. 
18  At 65. 
19  At 65. 
20  At 65. 
21  At 71. 
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at by adding the mark up to the supplier’s costs. 22  The cost plus 
method is most useful where semi-finished goods are sold in an 
uncontrolled transaction, or where the controlled transaction involves 
the provision of services.23 
2  Transactional profit methods 5 
The remaining two methods are known as the transactional 
profit methods and calculate an arm’s length price by reference to the 
split profit margin that accrues to the relevant parties in a transaction. 
Profits arising from a controlled transaction may indicate whether the 
parties were transacting at arm’s length.24 10 
The first transactional profit method provided in the OECD 
guidelines is the transactional net margin method. Rather than 
calculating an arm’s length price, the net margin method calculates an 
arm’s length amount of profits. The guidelines require the arm’s 
length amount of profits to be calculated using a range of financial 15 
ratios, such as return on assets, operating income to sales revenue and 
other net profit measures. 25  Ideally, the net profit that a taxpayer 
realises from a controlled transaction should be compared to the net 
profit that an identical taxpayer would earn in an uncontrolled 
transaction in order to ensure that arm’s length net profit of the 20 
taxpayer in the controlled transaction has been reliably calculated.26  
The remaining profit method is the transactional profit split 
method. The profit split method arrives at an arm’s length amount of 
profits by taking the combined profits of a multinational group and 
splitting that amount between each of the associated enterprises within 25 
that multinational group. 27  Each enterprise within the multinational 
group is attributed an arm’s length share of profit that reflects the 
enterprise’s economic contribution to the combined group.28 
B Priority of Methods in the OECD Guidelines 
Each of the transfer pricing methods in the OECD guidelines is 30 
suited to particular situations. There is no single method that will yield 
                                               
22  At 71. 
23  At 71. 
24  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 77. 
25  At 78. 
26  At 77–78. 
27  At 93. 
28  At 93. 
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a reliable arm’s length result in every case. The guidelines prioritise 
the methods by setting out when one method should be selected and 
applied over another. 29  The traditional transactional methods are 
regarded as the most reliable way to show whether dealings between 
associated enterprises are arm’s length. The rationale is that any 5 
difference between the price of a controlled transaction and the price 
in an uncontrolled transaction can usually be traced directly back to 
the dealings and relations between the enterprises. The price 
differential is then easily overcome by substituting the price from the 
uncontrolled transaction into that between the parties in the controlled 10 
transaction. 30  Even if data concerning comparable uncontrolled 
transactions are difficult to obtain or are incomplete, the guidelines 
still urge tax authorities to use the traditional transactional methods 
and avoid deferring to the transactional profit methods.31 
The OECD acknowledges that in some situations the 15 
transactional profit methods may be more appropriate than traditional 
transaction methods. For example, the parties in a transaction may be 
so highly integrated that no comparable uncontrolled transaction data 
exist, making profit methods more suitable than traditional transaction 
ones. However, the guidelines point out weaknesses in the 20 
transactional profit methods that tell against their application. The 
main weakness is that profit-based methods are vulnerable to factors 
that show losses for reasons completely unconnected with price. 
Where an enterprise experiences a loss, it is difficult to determine 
whether that loss is attributable to a deficit in operating income from 25 
external factors (such as low sales demand), or whether that loss is 
attributable to internal factors such as transfer pricing practices. For 
example, the transactional net margin relies on the use of net profit 
indicators that can introduce greater volatility into transfer prices. The 
net profit indicator for a taxpayer may be influenced by factors that do 30 
not directly affect the gross margins and prices between independent 
entities, such as differences in operating expenses across enterprises. 
The volatility of net profit indicators makes it difficult to reliably 
compare a controlled entity to an uncontrolled entity. 
Not only do the guidelines point out the weaknesses in the 35 
profit methods, but the guidelines also highlight particular situations 
                                               
29  At 59. 
30  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 60. 
31  At 60. 
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where profit methods should never be used. The guidelines warn tax 
authorities against using profit methods to attack an enterprise that 
appears to be more successful or less successful than the enterprise’s 
average performance suggests:32 
In no case should transactional profit methods be used so as to 5 
result in over-taxing enterprises mainly because they make profits 
lower than the average, or in under-taxing enterprises that make 
higher than average profits. There is no justification under the 
arm’s length principle for imposing additional tax on enterprises 
that are less successful than average or, conversely, for under-10 
taxing enterprises that are more successful than average, when the 
reason for their success or lack thereof is attributable to 
commercial factors. 
The OECD guidelines show a strong overall preference for the 
application of traditional transactional methods over transactional 15 
profit methods. The guidelines do allow for the application of 
transactional profit methods, but they warn that such methods should 
be approached with caution and applied only as measures of last 
resort.33  
C  Harmonisation, the Arm’s Length Principle and the OECD 20 
Guidelines 
The widespread acceptance by states of the arm’s length 
principle has created a common international approach to transfer 
pricing. The principle has proliferated in bilateral tax conventions 
since first appearing in art 4 of the Convention Concerning Double 25 
Taxation between the United States and France.34 The United States 
Treasury Department notes that not only is the standard included in all 
United States double tax treaties, but it is also included in most double 
tax treaties to which the United States is not a party.35 Furthermore, 
virtually every major industrial nation uses the arm’s length principle 30 
when addressing transfer pricing issues.36 Developing countries such 
                                               
32  At 61. 
33  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 105. 
34  Brian D Lepard “Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right? 
A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Normative Authority of 
Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’s Length Standard as 
a Case Study” (1999) 10 Duke J Comp & Intl L 43 at 69; Convention 
Concerning double Taxation, United States–France (signed April 27 
1932), art 4. 
35  Lepard, above n 34, at 57. 
36  Lepard, above n 34, at 57. 
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as Chile, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela also apply the principle in 
their transfer pricing rules and even non-member countries such as 
Colombia apply the principle in their domestic legislation. 37  The 
prominence of the arm’s length principle in transfer pricing rules 
shows that the rules are already converging to a uniform standard. 5 
In addition to the wide-spread acceptance of the arm’s length 
principle in domestic legislation, harmonisation of transfer prices also 
requires wide-spread acceptance of the OECD guidelines. Conformity 
with the guidelines ensures that the arm’s length principle is applied 
consistently by tax authorities. According to a global transfer pricing 10 
survey carried out in 2013, all of the 58 countries surveyed apply the 
methods in the OECD guidelines to calculate an arm’s length result.38 
For example, the OECD guidelines are directly incorporated into 
legislation in the United Kingdom. Paragraph 1(2) of sch 16 to the 
Finance Act 1998 contains the basic rule on transfer pricing. The rule 15 
requires the profits or losses of a potentially advantaged person to be 
computed as if arm’s length provision had been imposed instead of the 
actual provision.39 Paragraphs 2(1)–(3) in sch 16 require the schedule 
to be construed in such manner as best secures consistency between 
the OECD guidelines, OECD model tax convention and other OECD 20 
documents that comprise transfer pricing guidelines. 
The development of transfer pricing legislation in Australia 
also shows how the OECD guidelines can shape and inform a country’s 
transfer pricing rules. The Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax 
Avoidance and Multinational Profit Shifting) Act 2013 introduced 25 
new rules into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.40 Subdivision 
815-B in the amendment Act requires certain amounts (taxable 
income, particular losses, tax offsets and withholding tax payable) to 
be worked out by applying arm’s length principle set out in the OECD 
model tax convention.41 The amendment Act was passed as a direct 30 
response to the OECD’s own report looking into ways to improve 
                                               
37  Calderon, above n 13, at 5. 
38  Deloitte “2013 Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide” (2013) 
<www.deloitte.com>. The countries that apply the OECD arm’s length 
methods do not necessarily apply them according to the priority of 
that the OECD guidelines set out. 
39  Finance Act 1998 (UK), sch 16. 
40  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth), sch 2. 
41  Tax Laws Amendment (Cross-Border Transfer Pricing) Bill 2012 (No 
1) (explanatory memorandum) at 2.18. 
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transfer pricing.42 The report is called Addressing Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting. The report notes the growing concerns by governments 
that multinational enterprises are exploiting existing OECD transfer 
pricing rules in order to engage in profit shifting.43 Statements by the 
then Australian Assistant Treasurer, the Hon Bill Shorten MP, show 5 
the connection between Australia’s amended transfer pricing rules and 
the OECD’s own updates:44 
[Australia’s] Modernised transfer pricing rules will reinforce the 
integrity of the corporate tax base and align our rules more closely 
to international standards. Last year, for example, the OECD 10 
substantially updated its Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which are 
used by governments and businesses alike. 
The basis for the harmonisation of transfer pricing lies in 
states accepting both the arm’s length principle and the OECD 
guidelines. Once the arm’s length principle is incorporated into 15 
domestic legislation or a double tax treaty, the OECD guidelines guide 
the way that tax authorities apply the principle in order to arrive at an 
arm’s length result. The ability of the arm’s length principle to induce 
the harmonisation of transfer pricing is therefore dependent on two 
factors: the principle’s inclusion into domestic law or treaty law, and 20 
the application of the OECD guidelines to the principle.  
III  Divergence 
The arm’s length principle has been widely accepted and 
integrated into both domestic law and treaty law provisions of OECD 
member and non-member states. The integration indicates that there is 25 
already a high level of convergence in the way that states address 
cross-border transfer pricing issues. The existence of an international 
transfer pricing regime has resulted in a gradual creeping whereby 
domestic tax rules have been increasingly moulded by OECD transfer 
pricing policies and principles. The process is all the more remarkable 30 
because it has occurred without any binding multilateral agreements 
                                               
42  Kevin A Bell “Australia Welcomes OECD BEPS Report, Introduces 
Transfer Pricing Legislation” (2013) 21 Tax Management 
International Pricing Report 1035 at 1035. 
43  OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) at 13. 
44  Bill Shorten “Robust Transfer Pricing Rules for Multinationals” (press 
release, 1 November 2011). 
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backed by an international body, and indeed without any binding 
written agreement of any sort at all. 
The fundamental weakness in the harmonisation of transfer 
pricing policies is that integration into domestic law allows for 
divergence from the international transfer pricing framework. A 5 
state’s obligation to apply the principle or the guidelines only arises if 
the obligation is integrated the domestic law of the state. There are 
two main ways for the integration to occur. First, domestic transfer 
pricing provisions may be drafted on the basis of the transfer pricing 
regime, taking into account the OECD guidelines, the OECD model 10 
convention and the accompanying commentary.45 Second, integration 
may occur through the conclusion of tax treaties that incorporate the 
wording of art 9 of the OECD model convention into its provisions.46 
The treaties are then given effect to in domestic law by further state 
action.47 15 
There are several examples of where the integration of OECD 
rules into domestic law has allowed for a divergence from the arm’s 
length principle. The examples fall into two distinct categories: those 
where there is both a domestic law provision and a treaty law 
provision that incorporate the arm’s length principle, but differ in 20 
wording and effect; and those where the domestic law provisions are 
of themselves inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 
A  Competing Treaty and Domestic Law Rules: Australia 
The evolution of transfer pricing rules in Australia is a clear 
example of a divergence from the arm’s length principle. Australia’s 25 
transfer pricing rules are found in both domestic legislation and in the 
provisions of Australia’s double tax treaties. The interaction between 
treaty rules and domestic rules was considered in SNF (Australia) Pty 
                                               
45  Calderon, above n 13, at 16. 
46  Calderon, above n 13, at 16. 
47  If integration occurs through the conclusion of a double tax treaty, that 
treaty requires further state action to have the force of law. Such 
action may occur through a direct adoption method (where a treaty 
ratified by the executive is automatically incorporated into domestic 
law); or through an indirect adoption method (where a ratified treaty 
only has legislative force after it has been legislated into domestic law 
by parliament). See Nabil Orow “Comparative Approaches to the 
Interpretation of Double Tax Conventions” (2005) 26 Adel L Rev 73 
at 78. 
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Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.48 The decision held that 
differences between Australian domestic law and treaty law preclude 
the tax authority from reconstructing a transfer price based solely on 
treaty provisions. 49  Subsequent amendments to Australia’s transfer 
pricing rules overturned the effect of the SNF decision.50 The position 5 
of Australian law prior to the transfer pricing amendments was 
consistent with the arm’s length principle. The subsequent 
amendments to Australia’s transfer pricing rules have created a 
divergence from the principle. 
1  Interaction between Australian domestic law and treaty law 10 
pre-amendments 
Australian treaty law is incorporated into domestic law 
through an indirect adoption method. A ratified treaty only has legal 
force after it has been legislated into domestic law by an Act of 
parliament.51 A double tax treaty, for example, obtains the force of 15 
law by being added as a schedule to the International Tax Agreements 
Act 1953.52 Section 4(1) of the International Tax Agreements Act then 
incorporates the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
into the International Agreements Act so that the two Acts are read 
together.53 The Income Tax Assessment Act, which computes the tax 20 
base and imposes tax,54 is duplicated in the treaty law and applies to 
residents from states that have signed a double tax treaty with 
Australia. 55  Section 4(2) of the International Tax Agreements Act 
clarifies any inconsistencies between the scheduled treaty provisions 
and the incorporated Income Tax Assessment Act provisions. It 25 
provides that the provisions of the International Tax Agreements Act 
(including the scheduled treaty law) apply in the event of any 
                                               
48  SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] 
FCA 635, (2010) 79 ATR 193; aff’d Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 74, [2011] 193 
FCR 149. 
49  See Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd 
[2011] FCAFC 74, [2011] 193 FCR 149. 
50  See Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and 
Multinational Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth). 
51  Robert L Deutsch (ed) Australia’s Double Taxation Agreements 
(Legal Books, Sydney, 2000) at 5. 
52  Robert L Deutsch, above n 51, at 5. 
53  International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), s 4(1). 
54  See Income Tax Act 1986 (Cth), ss 4 and 5(1). 
55  Richard Krever and Jiaying Zhang “Australia: Resolving the 
Application of Competing Treaty and Domestic Law Transfer Pricing 
Rules” in M Lang and others Tax Treaty Case Law Around the Globe 
(Linde, Vienna, 2011) 199 at 202. 
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inconsistencies with the incorporated Income Tax Assessment Act.56 
An incorporated tax treaty in Australia therefore carries the force of 
law and features both the existing Australian taxing laws plus the 
legally binding provisions of the treaty itself. 
Krever and Zhang point out that in general the interaction 5 
between provisions in treaty and domestic law is relatively 
straightforward.57 Usually domestic law will create a right to tax and 
treaty law will act as a restriction on that right. The authors use a 
simple withholding tax example to illustrate the point. Under domestic 
law non-residents must pay a 30 per cent withholding tax on royalties 10 
sourced in Australia.58 The domestic rule is restricted by Australia’s 
double tax treaties that cap the withholding tax payable on the basis of 
art 12 of the OECD model convention. 59  However, because of 
differences in construction, the interaction between domestic law and 
treaty law on transfer pricing is less straightforward. 15 
The Australian statutory rules on transfer pricing were 
formerly found in Division 13 of the Income Tax Assessment Act.60 
Section 136AD of Division 13 applied to the supply or acquisition of 
property under an international agreement between an Australian 
taxpayer and a foreign party who did not deal with each other at arm’s 20 
length in relation to the amount of consideration.61 Where s 136AD 
applied, the Commissioner was required to substitute an arm’s length 
consideration in respect of the supply or acquisition.62 The amount of 
consideration was treated as income for the purpose of determining 
source under s 136AE.63 Taxable income64 under Australian law is in 25 
turn calculated by measuring gross income, 65  and deductions from 
gross income allowed. 66  The calculation differs from other 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, that treat income as profit 
                                               
56  International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), s 4(2). 
57  Krever and Zhang, above n 55, at 203. 
58  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 128B(2B) and 128B(5A); 
and Income Tax (Dividends, Interest and Royalties Withholding Tax) 
Act 1974 (Cth), s 7(c). 
59  Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, above n 9, art 12. 
60  Repealed by Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and 
Multinational Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth), sch 2. The version of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) prior to repeal is available 
at <www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00395/Html/Volume_1>. 
61  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 136AD (repealed). 
62  Sections 136AD(1)-(3). 
63  Section 136AE. 
64  Section 4-15. 
65  Section 6-5. 
66  Section 4-15. 
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for the purpose of corporate taxation. 67 Division 13 in Australian law 
did not provide for the taxation of profits per se. Where a cross-border 
transaction was not arm’s length, the Commissioner of Taxation in 
Australia could not modify a company’s profits when reassessing the 
taxpayer’s taxable income. The Commissioner was only empowered 5 
to do recalculate either the consideration paid or received in the 
impugned transaction.  
Australia has entered into over 35 full double tax treaties with 
a combination OECD member and non-member states. 68  All of the 
treaties by and large follow the format of the OECD model convention 10 
promulgated at the time the treaties were being negotiated and 
concluded. Cross-border transactions between associated enterprises 
in the current OECD model are addressed in art 9(1).69 That article, 
when incorporated into domestic law as a schedule to the International 
Agreements Act 1953, obtains the force of law and provides the 15 
Commissioner with the power to recalculate the profits of an 
enterprise, not just gross income or allowed deductions. The 
distinction between the treaty law that includes art 9(1) and the 
provisions of Division 13 is that the former provided a wider taxing 
power than the latter. The treaty law provided a taxing right on profits 20 
through the recalculation of income that was not available under the 
provisions of Division 13. As Krever and Zhang remark, the wider 
power was previously “unknown in Australian law”.70 
Prior to Australia’s transfer pricing amendments, the 
inconsistency between Division 13 and treaty law was subject to much 25 
debate. 71  The Australian Tax Office in its advice on the issue 
determined that the Commissioner may apply the provisions of either 
Division 13 or the treaty provisions. 72 Thus the Commissioner has 
                                               
67  Sections 6(1) and 6(4). 
68  Robert L Deutsch, above n 51, at 5. 
69  Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, above n 9, art 9(1). 
70  Krever and Zhang, above n 55, at 207. 
71  Dixon Hearder “New Transfer Pricing Legislation – Phase Two” 
(2013) 19 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 136 at 141. 
72  Australian Tax Office Income tax: application of the Division 13 
transfer pricing provisions to loan arrangements and credit balances 
(Taxation Ruling TR 92/11, October 1992) at 62(a). However, where 
the application of Division 13 would produce a result that is 
inconsistent with the treaty provisions, the latter will prevail; 
Australian Tax Office Income tax: arm's length transfer pricing 
methodologies for international dealings (Taxation Ruling TR 97/20, 
November 1997) at 1.7–1.8; and Australian Tax Office Income tax: 
application of Division 13 of Part III (international profit shifting) - 
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held to the view that where the treaty provisions yield a higher tax 
liability than domestic provisions, an assessment can be based on the 
higher amount under the treaty. The particular situation arose in SNF 
(Australia) Pty Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 73  The 
Federal Court ruled that, contrary to the Commissioner’s view, 5 
alternate taxing powers sourced in treaty law were not available under 
Australian law.74 
2  The decision in SNF 
The first instance decision in SNF considered the application of 
s 136AD in Division 13 to purchases by a multinational subsidiary.75 10 
The multinational group was a French-based industrial chemicals 
manufacturer called SNF. The SNF subsidiary in Australia was the 
taxpayer. It purchased industrial cleaning products from SNF 
subsidiaries located in the United States, France and China. Australia 
has concluded bilateral tax treaties with each of the three countries 15 
and each treaty contains an article identical to the terms in art 9 of the 
OECD model convention. Despite evidence of good sales performance 
during the period from 1998 to 2004, SNF Australia incurred 
substantial trading losses. 76  The Commissioner reassessed the 
taxpayer’s income over the sales period under the treaty provisions in 20 
order to produce a higher tax liability on the basis that the taxpayer’s 
trading losses were purely the result of artificially high transfer pricing 
practices.77 
On the facts of the case an assessment under Division 13 
would have yielded an entirely different result from an assessment 25 
under the bilateral tax treaty. Section 136AD of Division 13 permitted 
the Commissioner to make transfer pricing adjustments to an 
arrangement after assessing whether the price paid reflects arm’s 
length consideration. 78 Division 13 did not prescribe any particular 
                                                                                                              
some basic concepts underlying the operation of Division 13 and some 
circumstances in which section 136AD will be applied (Taxation 
Ruling TR 94/14, December 2011) at 154–158. 
73  See above n 48. 
74  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] 
FCAFC 74, [2011] 193 FCR 149.  
75  SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] 
FCA 635, (2010) 79 ATR 193. 
76  SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above 
n 75, at [12]. 
77  At [13] and [164]. 
78  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 136AD (repealed). 
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method for the purpose of ascertaining an arm’s length amount. 79 
However, the court considered that the then 1979 and 1995 OECD 
guidelines played a role in choosing the appropriate method and set 
out a priority of methods, beginning with the traditional transactional 
methods described in Part I. 5 
The court elected to apply the comparable uncontrolled price 
method in order to find arm’s length consideration through 
comparable transactions. 80  According to the court the comparable 
uncontrolled price method best accorded with the requirements of 
Division 13.81 Section 136AD of the division gave particular focus to 10 
the price paid between non-arm’s length parties in an impugned 
acquisition. The section required an analysis of the consideration that 
might reasonably be expected to have passed between independent 
parties dealing at arm’s length with each other in relation to the 
acquisition of the property under the transaction. 82 An analysis of 15 
truly comparable transactions involving the acquisition of similar 
property in similar products, such as in a comparable uncontrolled 
price method, would best accord with Division 13. The court then 
accepted the taxpayer’s comparable uncontrolled price calculations. 
The calculations showed that despite continual operating losses, the 20 
price it paid for the acquisition was comparable to the arm’s length 
price paid by independent entities in similar transactions. 83  The 
Commissioner’s reassessment therefore failed. 
The Commissioner accepted that Division 13 was engaged in 
the case but nevertheless argued that its interpretation must be 25 
construed in the context of Australia’s bilateral tax treaties. The 
treaties would yield a different result from that reached by the first 
instance court. The essence of the Commissioner’s argument was that 
a reassessment of income on the basis of profit under the wider art 
9(1) inquiry in Australia’s treaties allowed transactional profit 30 
methods to be used as a proxy for price in order to indicate whether 
the consideration was arm’s length under the narrower s 136AD. 
Applying a profit-based method, the taxpayer’s poor profitability 
relative to other independent entities with similar risk profiles showed 
that more than arm’s length consideration was paid by the taxpayer. 35 
                                               
79  At [56]. 
80  At [62]. 
81  At [129]. 
82  At [42]. 
83  At [164]–[171]. 
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Reassessment under ss 136AD(1)–(3) was required. 84  The court 
rejected the argument as Division 13 did not allow a reassessment on 
the basis of profitability when data showing comparable prices could 
be adduced.85 
The Commissioner made a similar submission on appeal 5 
before the full Federal Court, arguing that the OECD guidelines could 
be used to assist in the interpretation of Division 13 as those sections 
ought to be illuminated by the meaning of the treaties. 86 The Federal 
Court agreed with the reasoning of the trial judge on this point and 
dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal. 10 
The decision in SNF clarified the interaction between 
Australia’s transfer pricing rules found in treaty law and domestic law: 
the application of Division 13 required as a matter of law the use of 
methods that use truly comparable transactions if they are available on 
the facts. The result is consistent with the arm’s length principle 15 
promulgated by the OECD:87 
 … where … a traditional transaction method and a transactional 
profit method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the 
traditional transaction method is preferable to the transactional 
profit method. 20 
Subsequent amendments to income tax legislation in response 
to the SNF decisions have moved Australia’s transfer price regime 
away from the OECD guidelines on the arm’s length principle. The 
next section discusses these amendments in order to show how 
Australian law has subsequently diverged from the arm’s length 25 
principle and the OECD guidelines. 
3  Interaction between Australian domestic law and treaty law 
post-amendments 
The Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and 
Multinational Profit Shifting) Act 2013 overturns the effect of the SNF 30 
decisions and confirms the availability of a broader, profit-based 
approach under Australian law. The Act purports to bring Australia’s 
                                               
84  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd, above n 
74, at [9]. 
85  SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd. v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above 
n 75, 193 at [129]. 
86  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd, above n 
74, at [118]. 
87  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 60. 
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transfer pricing rules into line with the OECD position. 88  The Act 
repealed the transfer pricing rules in Division 13 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 and inserted subdivisions 815-B, 815-C and 
815-D into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.89 Subdivision 815-
B applies to separate legal entities and provides for a closer alignment 5 
between Australia’s bilateral tax treaties and its domestic laws.90 The 
new subdivision continues to apply the arm’s length principle. Where 
an entity receives a transfer pricing benefit from its financial or 
commercial relations with another entity, arm’s length conditions are 
substituted in place of those that gave rise to the benefit.91 Subdivision 10 
815-B creates a scheme whereby a taxpayer is deemed to have 
operated at non-arm’s length if a hypothetical taxpayer in similar 
circumstances would have provided different consideration. In making 
such an assessment the amendments prescribe a wide range of 
conditions that must be taken into account.92 The conditions signal a 15 
clear departure from the narrow focus on price that was called for 
under Division 13. For example, in addition to prices, arm’s length 
conditions include gross margins, net profits, the division of profit 
between the entities,93 and any other surrounding circumstances that 
may be relevant.94 The Federal Court in SNF expressly rejected the 20 
type of inquiry that the amendments now permit:95 
I do not accept the Commissioner’s submission that the test is to 
determine what consideration an arm’s length party in the position 
of the taxpayer would have given for the products. The essential 
task is to determine the arm’s length consideration in respect of 25 
the acquisition. One way to do this is to find truly comparable 
transactions … (emphasis added). 
The broader arm’s length conditions set out in the amendment 
Act feed in to the choice of arm’s length method. The Commissioner 
                                               
88  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Bill 2013 (explanatory memorandum) at 2.1 
89  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth), sch 2. 
90  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Bill 2013 (explanatory memorandum) at 2.2. 
91  Income Tax Assessment Act 1997(Cth), s 815-115. 
92  Income Tax Assessment Act 1997(Cth), s 815-125. 
93  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Act 2013 (Cth), note 1 to s 815-115. 
94  Note 1 to s 815-115 is not exhaustive and accommodates other 
conditions that may be operating between entities where one of them 
receives a transfer pricing benefit. 
95  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd, above n 
74, at [93]. 
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no longer faces the restriction that was apparent in SNF. The 
Commissioner, as a matter of law, does not have to rely on the use of 
pricing data in comparable transactions. Rather, the amendment Act’s 
broader focus permits the Commissioner to prefer transactional profit 
methods over traditional transactional methods in situations where the 5 
latter do not show evidence of a non-arm’s length result. The outcome 
in SNF would likely be different if the case were decided under the 
amended Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. Using a profit method 
based on a wider range of arm’s length conditions under s 815-115 of 
the Act, the Commissioner would have been able to show that the 10 
taxpayer’s lack of profitability demonstrated non-arm’s length 
dealings. It would not matter that the taxpayer could already prove 
that its dealings were arm’s length under a transactional method where 
independent parties in comparable transactions had paid similar prices 
for similar products. The amendments to Australia’s transfer pricing 15 
rules permit profitability, not just price, to establish whether a 
transaction was carried out at arm’s length. 
4 Inconsistency with arm’s length principle 
The amendments create a divergence from the OECD 
guidelines. While the OECD guidelines do not prohibit a broader profit-20 
based focus to establish arm’s length conditions, they do not endorse it 
where there is sufficient data to apply a traditional transactional 
analysis. 96 Australia’s amendments are intended to accord with the 
OECD position on transfer pricing. 97  However, by granting the 
Commissioner the power to apply profit methods even where 25 
traditional transactional ones can be reliably used,98 the provisions of 
the amendment Act diverge from the OECD guidelines on the arm’s 
length principle. 
B  Divergent Domestic Law Provisions: the United States 
The transfer pricing rules in the United States provide another 30 
example of where domestic provisions diverge from the arm’s length 
principle promulgated by the OECD. The United States Tax Court 
decision in National Semiconductor Corporation and Consolidated 
                                               
96  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, above n 10, at 60. 
97  Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational 
Profit Shifting) Bill 2013 (explanatory memorandum) at 2.1 
98  The question whether traditional transactional methods are as reliable 
as the OECD guidelines suggest is considered in Part IV. 
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Subsidiaries v Commissioner of Internal Revenue illustrates how the 
application of United States rules to transfer pricing disputes is 
inconsistent with the OECD guidelines.99 
1 Transfer pricing rules and regulations 
Unlike the extensive provisions in subdivision 815B of the 5 
Australian transfer pricing rules, the United States Internal Revenue 
Code only has one provision that addresses transfer pricing. Section 
482 provides:100 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses 
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the 10 
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may 
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, 
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or 
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, 15 
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or 
clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, 
or businesses. 
On the face of it § 482 is broad in scope and gives the Internal 
Revenue Service a wide adjustment power in order to clearly reflect 20 
taxable income. The section has no prescribed conditions that the 
Service must have regard to in determining an appropriate level of 
income, nor is there any reference to the arm’s length principle to 
guide any adjustment. Kotraba points out that “[i]n general, § 482 
gives the Service carte blanche to adjust the taxable income of a 25 
multinational as it deems appropriate.”101 The detail underlying § 482 
is left to regulations developed by the United States Department of the 
Treasury. The regulations are contained in the United States Code of 
Federal Regulations and set up the general principles and guidelines to 
be followed under § 482. 102  According to the regulations, the 30 
overarching purpose of § 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect 
income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the 
                                               
99  National Semiconductor Corporation and Consolidated Subsidiaries v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 67 TC 2849 (1994). Although 
decided in 1994, the case has received no subsequent negative judicial 
treatment in the United States. 
100  Internal Revenue Code 23USC, § 482. 
101  Christopher Kotraba “Better than the ‘Best’: Transfer Pricing 
Methodology in the Wake of Roche” (2009) 48 Colum J Transnat’l L 
140 at 146. 
102  Code of Federal Regulations Title 26, reg 1.482-1(a)(1). 
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avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions.103 The purpose is 
achieved by treating related parties as if they were dealing at arm’s 
length with one another in a similar transaction and under similar 
circumstances (the arm’s length principle).104 
The regulations provide for a range of arm’s length methods 5 
that may be used to evaluate whether related parties are operating at 
arm’s length from each other. These methods are listed in regs 1.482-
3(a)(1)–(6) in respect of tangible property and regs 1.482-4(a)(1)–(4) 
in respect of intangible property. The methods align with those set out 
in the OECD guidelines and consist of the traditional transactional 10 
methods and the transactional profit based methods. Crucially, 
however, the selection of the most appropriate method is not 
influenced by a priority of methods. Instead, the United States 
implements a best method rule where the method used to determine an 
arm’s length standard must be the one that “under the facts and 15 
circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length 
result.”105 The rule represents a significant divergence from the arm’s 
length principle promulgated by the OECD. 
2 Inconsistency with arm’s length principle 
Under the best method rule, reliability is determined by two 20 
factors: the degree of comparability between a controlled and 
uncontrolled transaction; and the quality of the data and assumptions 
used in the analysis.106 The degree of comparability and the quality of 
data are assessed on the basis of a range of conditions, including a 
comparison of the functions performed and associated resources 25 
employed by the taxpayers in each transaction; the contractual terms 
in each transaction being compared; and the risks and economic 
conditions faced by the entities in each transaction.107 
The best method rule is inconsistent with the OECD guidelines. 
The best method rule allows the use of profit based methods in 30 
circumstances where the OECD guidelines recommend traditional 
transactional based ones. The nature of the divergence is similar to the 
effect of the Australian transfer pricing amendments described above. 
For example, suppose that Fictitious Corporation is incorporated in the 
                                               
103  Regulation 1.482-1(a)(1). 
104  Regulation 1.482-1(a)(1) and 1.482-1(a)(3)(b). 
105  Regulation 1.482-1(c)(1). 
106  Regulation 1.482-1(c)(2)(i). 
107  Regulation 1.482-1(d)(1) and 1.482-1(d)(3)(i)–(v). 
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United States and is preparing its income tax return for a given 
year.108 The best method rule allows Fictitious Corp to choose from 
five equally appropriate methods so long as it is the most reliable 
under reg 1.482-1(a)(1). If each of the methods is equally reliable, but 
yield a different taxable income, Fictitious Corp will choose the 5 
method that yields the lowest taxable amount. The method resulting in 
the lowest taxable income could be a traditional transactional method 
(as was the case in SNF). The Internal Revenue Service may 
nevertheless challenge Fictitious Corp’s chosen method and elect to 
apply another one that yields a higher taxable amount of income; for 10 
example, a profit-based method. Regulation 1.482-1(c) allows the 
selection of another method when it states that “[a]n arm’s length 
result may be determined by any method without establishing the 
inapplicability of another method”. 109  Therefore, the Revenue does 
not have to establish the inapplicability of Fictitious Corp’s traditional 15 
transactional method before choosing to apply its own higher-yielding 
profit-based method. 
These hypothetical facts materialised in National 
Semiconductor Corporation and Consolidated Subsidiaries v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 110  The decision in National 20 
Semiconductor considered the application of § 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code to purchases by a multinational subsidiary. The 
multinational group was a United States-based semiconductor 
manufacturer called National Semiconductor Corporation. The 
National Semiconductor subsidiary in the United States was the tax 25 
payer. It purchased packaged semiconductor devices from National 
Semiconductor subsidiaries located in Southeast Asia. The United 
States operations incurred substantial operating losses from the 
payments, while the Southeast Asian affiliates reported net profits in 
every year in issue.111 30 
The taxpayer relied on the comparable uncontrolled price 
method in order to show that its transfer prices were charged at arm’s 
                                               
108  The following is a hypothetical example adapted from Michael 
Auramovich “Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 482: The Noose Tightens On 
Multinational Corporations” (1995) 28 J Marshall L Rev 915 at 915–
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109  Regulation 1.482-1(c). 
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length under § 482; whereas the Revenue presented two analyses 
under the profit-split and transactional net margin methods. Both 
parties presented a number of experts to support their positions. The 
Revenue sought a reallocation of USD 83.1 million to the taxpayer’s 
income on the basis of higher-yielding profit-split and transactional 5 
net margin methods. 112  The taxpayer’s methods showed that, if 
anything, the Southeast Asian subsidiaries were undercharging the 
taxpayer by USD 15.3 million compared to comparable uncontrolled 
prices. 113  There was no evidence, so the taxpayer argued, that the 
taxpayer was overcharging for the acquisition of the components in 10 
order to shift profits out of the United States. 
The Tax Court rejected the Revenue’s calculations as being 
unreasonable on the basis that the data included standard start-up costs 
for one of the Southeast Asian subsidiaries that did not reflect the true 
costs involved. 114  However, the court also rejected the taxpayer’s 15 
calculations for failing to provide satisfactory price comparators under 
the comparable uncontrolled price method. The court was nevertheless 
swayed by the economic theory behind the Revenue’s case and carried 
out its own modified assessment based on the Revenue’s findings.115 
The Revenue’s profit-based analyses compared the profits earned by 20 
each entity within the National Semiconductor group to the proportion 
of total assets held in each location.116 The comparison showed that 
the United States entity was earning less profit than it should have 
been when compared to the proportion of operating assets that the 
entity held within the group.117 25 
The court’s attraction to the economic theory behind the 
Revenue’s profit-based method shows that the court was interested in 
finding the true economic substance of profit from the United States 
entity. The court did not wish to engage in a narrow analysis of 
comparable pricing data under a traditional transactional method. 30 
Interestingly, the court relied on the Revenue’s findings on the basis 
that out of all the evidence presented, the Revenue’s was the least 
unacceptable.118 The Revenue’s evidence best reflected the economic 
effect of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing practices. Although the 
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taxpayer was able to find what it saw as comparable pricing data, in 
the court’s view those data did not adequately explain why the 
taxpayer was making a loss. The court determined that the United 
States operations should not have sustained losses while the Asian 
subsidiaries maintained high profits. 119  An income adjustment was 5 
therefore necessary. 
The case shows how abandoning a priority of methods gives a 
tax authority a wide discretion to cut across the taxpayer’s own 
traditional transactional calculations. The Australian discussion 
detailed how a movement away from a priority of methods is 10 
inconsistent with the OECD guidelines. The same observations are 
equally applicable in respect of the United States transfer pricing 
rules. The guidelines prefer arm’s length prices to be first calculated 
according to traditional transactional methods. The current best 
method rule in United States transfer pricing regulations is 15 
inconsistent with the OECD preference. The rule allows profit-based 
methods to trump traditional transactional ones in cases where the 
latter may already show arm’s length’s dealings. 
C Understanding the Divergence 
The Australia and United States rules on transfer pricing show 20 
a divergence from the arm’s length principle promulgated by the 
OECD. It should be stressed that this divergence is not wholesale. This 
essay does not suggest that countries are completely abandoning the 
arm’s length principle in favour of other approaches to taxing 
multinationals. The transfer pricing rules in Australia and the United 25 
States do show, however, that some OECD member countries are 
adopting differing views as to what sorts of results the arm’s length 
principle should produce when arm’s length conditions are being 
calculated. When asked the question “how long is arm’s length?” the 
answer by some states is different from the answer by the OECD. The 30 
OECD guidelines are a crucial component of the international transfer 
pricing regime and it is in this document that the OECD expresses its 
view on how long an arm’s length is according to its preferred order 
of methods. In spite of the OECD’s clear direction, states still feel free 
to develop rules that allow their tax authorities to diverge from the 35 
OECD guidelines.  
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The divergence is leading to a rise in the use of profit-based 
allocation methods. For example, in the United States in 2000, 67.2 
per cent of all transfer price methods that were agreed on in advance 
with the Revenue Service were profit-based.120 The proportion rose to 
75.6 per cent in 2008. The Australian Tax Office has also commented 5 
that profit methods such as the transactional net margin method have 
evolved as the transfer pricing method of choice over the years.121 The 
problem with profit-based methods is that their application often 
devolves into an analysis that more closely resembles a formulary 
division of income between the related parties in a multinational 10 
enterprise. 122  Formulary apportionment is a method of income 
allocation that splits the profits of a multinational group amongst all 
the subsidiaries in the various countries in which the multinational 
operates.123 The method applies a predetermined formula to each of 
the related parties in different countries and is usually based on factors 15 
such as sales, payroll, costs and assets.124 The relevant tax authority 
then taxes the relevant related party in its jurisdiction based on the 
amount of profit that the apportionment formula yields.125 
Formulary apportionment is considered the antithesis of the 
arm’s length principle because it treats a multinational as a single 20 
entity with related parts.126  By contrast, the arm’s length principle 
treats related parties within a multinational group as separate 
entities. 127  The similarities between the application of profit-based 
methods in the OECD guidelines and the application of formulary 
apportionment are seen in National Semiconductor Corporation.128 In 25 
that case the court applied a profit-based method and calculated the 
taxable income of the United States subsidiary on the basis of the 
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gross profit margin that could be expected to accrue to the subsidiary 
relative to the proportion of overall assets that the subsidiary held.129 
In substance there is little difference between the profit-based method 
that the court settled on and the way that formulary apportionment 
methods apply. The former is calculated by applying a formula to the 5 
profits of each subsidiary within the multinational group. 130  The 
relevant formula to apply is determined on a case-by-case basis for 
each related party within the group. 131  The latter formulary 
apportionment allocation is calculated by applying a predetermined 
formula to each subsidiary within a multinational group. 10 
Ideally, the level of taxable profit arrived at under an arm’s 
length profit-method should be compared with the level of profit that 
an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would be 
expected to achieve. 132  The comparability requirement is a 
distinguishing feature of profit-based methods from formulary 15 
apportionment.133 However, there is often a lack of comparable data 
that show the level of profit an independent enterprise would have 
achieved.134 The court’s profit-method in National Semiconductor did 
not utilise a profit comparison for that very reason.135 The court was 
not presented with any way to determine whether the taxpayer’s prices 20 
were comparable to third party prices. 136  As a result, profit-based 
methods are often applied in a similar fashion to formulary 
apportionment – that is, without using comparable data. The similarity 
between these approaches is such that the OECD guidelines even warn 
tax authorities against confusing profit methods with formulary 25 
apportionment.137 
The liberal use of profit-based methods in ways that resemble 
formulary apportionment diverges not just from the OECD guidelines, 
but also from the arm’s length principle itself. Some commentators 
suggest that the rise in the use of profit methods is most likely due to 30 
the ease with which they can be applied.138 Data on comparable prices 
necessary to apply traditional transactional methods are more difficult 
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to obtain than information on operating margins that is used in profit 
methods. 139  The primary advantage of profit methods therefore 
appears to be their simplicity. However, given the clear emphasis in 
the guidelines on traditional transactional methods, simplicity cannot 
be the only reason behind why states diverge from OECD policy. There 5 
must be other, more fundamental reasons driving the divergence from 
the arm’s length principle. Part IV goes on to explore what these 
reasons may be and assesses their implications for transfer pricing 
harmonisation. 
IV  Obstacles to Harmonisation 10 
Some of the OECD’s prominent members are diverging from 
the guidelines. The insistence of the OECD that the arm’s length 
principle be applied in accordance with the guidelines therefore begs 
the question. Are there compelling reasons for OECD members to 
diverge from the guidelines? The United States has historically been a 15 
world leader in international transfer pricing policy. It was one of the 
first countries to include an arm’s length provision in a bilateral tax 
treaty140 and in its domestic law.141 The United States’ transfer pricing 
efforts combined with the League of Nation’s own work in the 
transfer pricing area prompted other countries to include arm’s length 20 
provisions in their bilateral treaties.142 By 1961 the United States had 
joined the OECD and began actively promoting the arm’s length 
principle as an international norm. 143  The United States federal 
government campaigned strongly within the OECD on the principle as 
it perceived itself to be the nation most seriously affected by a lack of 25 
internationally accepted income allocation rules.144 
The fact that the United States rules on transfer pricing now 
diverge from the OECD regime that it helped champion suggests that 
there must be compelling reasons for not adhering to the OECD 
guidelines. Part IV assesses the reasons behind why divergence is 30 
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occurring and identifies three significant obstacles to transfer pricing 
harmonisation. 
A  Legal Status of the Guidelines and the Arm’s Length Principle 
Outside Domestic Law and Treaty Law 
Some commentators argue that the arm’s length principle 5 
should be applied as an international rule of law.145 The argument, if 
correct, has important implications for the possibility of transfer 
pricing harmonisation. The stronger the obligation to apply the arm’s 
length principle consistently with the OECD guidelines, the more that 
transfer pricing rules in different states should converge. The section 10 
concludes that neither the principle nor the OECD guidelines are legally 
binding of themselves. As a result, the harmonisation of transfer 
pricing rules will be difficult to achieve, particularly if, as has been 
seen, states permit themselves to diverge from the transfer pricing 
regime that the OECD promulgates. 15 
1  Legal status of the arm’s length principle 
Many legal scholars have debated whether the arm’s length 
principle ought to be applied as a matter of customary international 
law, irrespective of the principle’s inclusion into domestic law or 
treaty law.146 The traditional theory of the requirements for existing 20 
customary international law is summarised by Anthony A 
D’Amato. 147  Existing customary international law has both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. The quantitative aspect requires a 
norm to be uniformly and consistently applied by a large number of 
states. 148  There is no bright-line test as to when a practice is 25 
sufficiently widespread to satisfy the quantitative requirement of an 
international law custom. The test is one of general recognition by 
states and is necessarily a vague one.149 But it is not necessary to show 
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that every state has recognised a certain practice.150 The qualitative 
aspect requires that states adhere to a norm out of a sense of legal 
obligation to do so, rather than out of social, moral or political habit 
(this requirement is referred to as opinio juris sive necessitas).151 
Many scholars agree that the arm’s length principle satisfies 5 
the quantitative requirement of a customary international law rule.152 
The arm’s length principle meets the test of consistent and uniform 
practice by states.153 It is applied in thousands of bilateral tax treaties; 
it is expressed in a uniform fashion by prominent multilateral 
organisations such as the OECD and the United Nations; 154  nations 10 
themselves attest to the widespread practice of the method 155  and 
commentators frequently observe that the arm’s length method 
prevails in the international arena.156 As one commentator observes, 
the arm’s length principle is “a strong contender for the status of 
customary international law.”157 15 
The more contentious point is whether states apply the arm’s 
length principle out of a sense of legal obligation (the qualitative 
aspect). One legal scholar, Lepard, questions whether states regard the 
principle as universally binding in the absence of a treaty imposing an 
obligation to use it. 158  According to Lepard, states’ continued 20 
resistance against the adoption of a multilateral agreement that 
includes the arm’s length principle constitutes compelling evidence 
that states do not wish to owe obligations to other states with whom 
no bilateral tax treaty has been concluded.159 The reason that the arm’s 
length principle exists in a network of bilateral tax treaties is because 25 
very few states showed any willingness to be bound to a multilateral 
framework when the League of Nations first considered the problem 
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of transfer pricing in the 1930s.160 The OECD attempted to revive the 
idea of a multilateral agreement some 30 years later and encountered a 
similar attitude from member states. States’ reluctance to be bound by 
a general obligation to use the arm’s length principle made a 
multilateral agreement impracticable. 161  Member states preferred to 5 
apply the arm’s length principle in a bilateral tax treaty only after a 
process of voluntary negotiation with another state. 162  The United 
Nations Group of Experts carried out its own report into the 
possibility of a multilateral tax agreement in 1977. The group reported 
that the development of a bilateral tax treaty network was an 10 
important step to the eventual conclusion of a multilateral tax 
agreement, but that a multilateral agreement was not yet feasible 
because there lacked a consensus on what standardised terms should 
be included in such an agreement. 163  The United Nations Ad Hoc 
Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters also 15 
looked into the establishment of binding transfer pricing rules through 
a multilateral agreement. The group rejected a proposal to enshrine a 
common set of transfer pricing principles because doing so could be 
perceived as a derogation from national sovereignty.164 In Lepard’s 
view, the reluctance of states to be bound by a multilateral agreement 20 
suggests that states wish to be free to choose their own allocation 
systems unless a bilateral treaty requires otherwise.165 States do not 
consider themselves under an obligation to apply the arm’s length 
principle in the absence of a bilateral treaty. 
Thomas is among one of a few scholars who claim that the 25 
arm’s length principle has reached the status of customary 
international law.166 Thomas argues that:167 
[The] vast network of bilateral treaties [that include the arm’s 
length principle] militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that 
separate accounting is a general rule of international law. Thus, 30 
there would appear to be a very persuasive general 
acknowledgement of a binding obligation to practice the separate 
accounting method. 
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Reuven makes a similar argument. Bilateral tax treaties, 
domestic tax laws and OECD documents form an international tax 
regime that is part of customary international law. 168  The regime 
requires that states, as a matter of obligation, implicitly accept and 
adhere to the regime’s rules and principles. Under this view, which is 5 
not without controversy,169 parts of international tax policy such as 
transfer pricing rules are binding as customary international law even 
in the absence of treaties.170  
The difficulty with the views put forward by Lepard and 
Thomas is that each author perceives a state’s entry into bilateral tax 10 
agreements as evidence of something different. On the one hand 
Lepard argues that a state’s entry into a bilateral tax treaty shows that 
the state wishes to limit the application of the arm’s length principle in 
transfer pricing to only those states with whom a treaty has been 
negotiated. If states wish to control when the principle is applied, then 15 
they do not consider themselves bound to apply it out of a sense of 
general obligation and will resist entering into multilateral agreements 
that impose such a general obligation. On the other hand, Thomas 
views a state’s entry into a bilateral tax treaty as direct evidence that 
the state feels itself bound to apply the principle. A state’s obligation 20 
to apply the arm’s length principle manifests itself through the 
conclusion of a bilateral treaty containing the principle. A bilateral 
treaty, rather than a multilateral one, is simply a state’s preferred 
means of giving effect to an obligation that it considers it is already 
under. Thus, Lepard’s argument that states’ resistance to a multilateral 25 
agreement proves that states do not view the application of the 
principle as a matter of obligation is not necessarily decisive. There 
may be other reasons unconnected with a state’s sense of obligation to 
apply the principle that leads states to refute a multilateral approach. 
For example, it could be that states wish to retain control over other 30 
aspects of bilateral treaties while at the same time being content to 
accept the transfer pricing aspects of such a treaty. 
Thomas’ argument is not decisive either. The problem with 
Thomas’ argument is that it fails to identify why states feel obligated 
to enter into bilateral treaties containing the arm’s length principle in 35 
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the first place. Thomas assumes that a state’s entry into a bilateral 
treaty containing the principle necessarily shows that the state 
considers itself under an obligation to adhere to the principle. But 
there are many other reasons that explain a state’s acceptance of the 
principle in bilateral tax treaties. For example, states have an 5 
economic interest in adhering to a uniform principle in an extensive 
bilateral treaty network. The use of a uniform standard enhances 
mutual cooperation between states and optimises the individual pay-
offs for each state in the form of reduced administrative burdens on 
tax authorities and greater certainty for taxpayers. Thomas’ argument 10 
does not adequately discount the other reasons that explain why states 
apply the arm’s length principle.171 
The weakness in Thomas’ argument may owe more to the 
weaknesses in the traditional definitions of customary international 
law. Such definitions are commonly criticised for their circularity. 15 
D’Amato opines that “if custom creates law, how can a component of 
custom require that the creative acts be in accordance with some prior 
right or obligation in international law?”.172 Thomas argues that a high 
probability of punitive action by other states towards errant states 
should accompany the existing qualitative requirements of binding 20 
custom to overcome the circularity of existing definitions.173 A state’s 
sense of obligation in adhering to a norm can be shown by that state’s 
desire to avoid sanction. 174  However, even if such a criterion is 
included in the definition of customary international law, Thomas 
concedes that it cannot be shown that there is high probability of a 25 
negative response by other nations to a nation that refuses to apply the 
arm’s length principle.175 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the arm’s length 
principle, it is not possible to conclude that the principle is legally 
binding as a customary international law norm outside of domestic 30 
law and treaty law. Whether the principle is being adhered to and 
included in bilateral treaties out of sense of legal obligation or for 
some other reason is still unclear. The finding does not mean that the 
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principle has no force at all. The high level of convergence in the way 
that states approach transfer pricing suggests that states do feel 
compelled to apply the principle. One explanation is that short of the 
principle having binding legal force, it is nevertheless a persuasive 
standard to which states ought to give great (but not decisive) weight 5 
in deciding how to allocate income. Accordingly, when states are 
considering the policy reasons for and against adherence to the 
principle, states ought to significantly discount the policy reasons 
against applying the principle and give more weight to those policy 
reasons that favour applying the principle. 10 
2  Legal status of the OECD guidelines 
The question whether the OECD guidelines constitute rules of 
customary international law is more straightforward. It again depends 
on the extent to which states consistently and uniformly make use of 
the OECD guidelines, and the extent to which states apply the 15 
guidelines out of a sense of general legal obligation. Only 20 of the 34 
OECD member states apply the arm’s length principle consistently with 
the guidelines. 176 The remaining 14 member states’ transfer pricing 
rules diverge from several aspects of the guidelines. For example, 
despite the priority of methods that the OECD guidelines set out, the 20 
Belgian tax authorities commonly accept profit-based methods when 
calculating arm’s length conditions.177 The Czech Republic does not 
require its tax authorities or taxpayers to refer to the OECD guidelines 
at all when calculating an arm’s length result. Instead, Czech tax 
authorities and taxpayers may select the most appropriate transfer 25 
pricing method on the basis of what the most reasonable method is, 
taking into account the specific circumstances of a transaction.178 The 
practice of applying the guidelines by states seems insufficiently 
widespread and insufficiently uniform to amount to a consistent and 
general practice in international custom.  30 
Even if the guidelines are already sufficiently practised by a 
large number of countries, they lack the general legal obligation that is 
required of customary international law. The status and usage of the 
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OECD guidelines was briefly considered by the Federal Court of 
Australia in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty 
Ltd. 179  In that case the Commissioner of Australia argued that the 
guidelines could be used as a legitimate aid to the construction of 
Australia’s double tax treaties.180 5 
The court was of the opinion that the guidelines were just that 
– guidelines – and could be applied as a matter of law only if the 
requirements of art 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties were met. 181  Article 31(3) allows subsequent practice 
between treaty partners to be taken into account when interpreting a 10 
treaty in context and in the light of its object and purpose. 182 The 
court’s insistence that the Commissioner could only rely on the 
guidelines if he could bring them within the rule in art 31(3) shows 
that the court did not feel a sense of general legal obligation to apply 
them. 15 
The fact that the guidelines are incorporated into transfer 
pricing legislation in the United Kingdom also shows that the OECD’s 
guidance is not customary law. If the guidelines did amount to 
customary law, then states would not be expected to incorporate them 
into domestic legislation because the guidelines would already apply 20 
as binding norms. Statements by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
GlaxoSmithKline Inc v R also deny the guidelines any legally binding 
character.183 The Supreme Court stated that the guidelines were not 
controlling as if they were a Canadian statute.184 While the guidelines 
are useful as a tool in interpreting Canadian transfer pricing 25 
provisions,185 they should not be read as if they are legally binding.186 
The OECD guidelines do not constitute legally binding rules on 
either member or non-member states. The guidelines are merely 
recommendations that the OECD Council urges its members to 
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apply.187 Despite the absence of binding legal effect as a customary 
norm, commentators argue that the guidelines “do not lack legal 
value” and have still been instrumental in bringing about a significant 
degree of transfer pricing harmonisation. 188  For example, Calderon 
suggests that although the guidelines are not legally binding, they still 5 
form an international touchstone for tax authorities to draw on when 
solving the problems associated with taxing the activities of 
multinational enterprises. The use of the guidelines as a touchstone by 
developed countries within the OECD may also create an expectation 
that other nations ought to do the same.189 The comments show that 10 
the guidelines have some way to go before achieving the status of 
custom, but that they are still important in shaping the development of 
future tax norms. 
This essay suggested that the arm’s length principle and the 
OECD guidelines are the two key elements required to bring about the 15 
harmonisation of transfer pricing rules. The essay then suggested that 
the extent of transfer pricing harmonisation would depend on the 
strength of the obligation to apply principle and the guidelines. This 
part has shown that neither the principle nor the guidelines are legally 
binding outside domestic or treaty law, but that each still exerts some 20 
persuasive force on states. Persuasive force is not enough to induce 
transfer pricing harmonisation. The existence of persuasive force 
leaves room for states to interpret the arm’s length principle as they 
see fit. In particular, states have the freedom and the flexibility to 
disregard the OECD interpretation of the arm’s length principle 25 
contained in its guidelines. The lack of legally binding effect of both 
the principle and the guidelines is a significant obstacle to transfer 
pricing harmonisation. 
B Theoretical Shortcomings of the Arm’s Length Principle 
Another obstacle to harmonisation is the theoretical flaw in the 30 
arm’s length principle. The principle is criticised for not taking 
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account of the economic interdependence between related entities.190 
By treating the related parts of a multinational enterprise as separate 
entities, the principle fails to reflect the economies of scale and other 
benefits of integration that integrated businesses enjoy.191 It fails to 
reflect the economic reality in which multinationals operate. The 5 
criticism is most apparent in cases where the comparable uncontrolled 
price method is applied to certain circumstances. The facts of 
GlaxoSmithKline Inc v The Queen in the Tax Court of Canada 
illustrate the point.192 
The first instance decision in GlaxoSmithKline Inc considered 10 
the application of Canada’s transfer pricing rules to purchases by a 
multinational subsidiary. The parent in the multinational group was a 
United Kingdom resident corporation called Glaxo Group Ltd. The 
Glaxo group provides healthcare and pharmaceutical products around 
the world. 193 The Glaxo subsidiary in Canada was the taxpayer. It 15 
purchased an active pharmaceutical ingredient called ranitidine from a 
Glaxo subsidiary in Switzerland called Adecha. Ranitidine is used by 
the taxpayer an anti-ulcer drug, marketed under the brand name 
Zantac. 194  The Zantac trademark and the patent for the active 
ingredient ranitidine were owned by the parent company in the United 20 
Kingdom. 195  In order for the taxpayer to manufacture and market 
Zantac, it entered into two separate contracts. The first contract was a 
licence agreement under which the taxpayer paid a six per cent royalty 
to the parent company on the net sales of Zantac.196 In return, the 
United Kingdom parent company granted the taxpayer the right to 25 
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manufacture and sell products, the right to use the trademarks owned 
by the Glaxo group, including Zantac, and other rights therein.197 The 
second contract was a supply agreement under which Adecha granted 
the taxpayer the right to purchase ranitidine and set the purchase price 
for the ranitidine.198 5 
From 1990 to 1993, the taxpayer paid between CAD 1,512 and 
CAD 1,651 per kilogram for the purchase of ranitidine from Adescha 
SA. 199  During the same period, two Canadian pharmaceutical 
companies that manufactured generic anti-ulcer drugs only paid 
between CAD 194 and CAD 304 per kilogram for the same active 10 
ingredient. The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the taxpayer 
for the relevant taxation years, increasing its taxable income by nearly 
CAD 51 million on the basis that it had paid Adescha more than a 
reasonable amount under the former arm’s length provision in the then 
s 69(2) of the Income Tax Act 1995.200 To support this position the 15 
Minister applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (described 
in Part II above), and used the prices paid for ranitidine by the two 
manufacturers of the generic anti-ulcer drugs as the relevant price 
comparators. 201  The taxpayer argued that the amounts paid for 
ranitidine by the two manufacturers did not constitute valid 20 
comparators.202 The existence of the licence agreement and supply 
agreement meant that the taxpayer purchased ranitidine under wholly 
different business circumstances to the two generic-drug 
manufacturers.203 The taxpayer also used the comparable uncontrolled 
price method, but relied on a different set of price comparators in 25 
order to show that the prices it charged to Asecha were arm’s length. 
The Glaxo group corporations often promoted and distributed Zantac 
through independent third party distributors in addition to its own 
subsidiaries. Under third party agreements, Glaxo group transfer 
prices were set so that the independent distributors retained a 60 per 30 
cent gross margin from the sale of ranitidine-based products.204 If, for 
example, a ranitidine product was sold by an independent distributor 
in Italy for CAD 10, then the price charged by the Glaxo supplier 
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would be CAD 4. The taxpayer relied on the prices in these 
agreements as more appropriate comparators in a comparable 
uncontrolled method because the prices better reflected the business 
circumstances faced by the taxpayer.205 
The main difference between the parties’ approaches was 5 
whether an arm’s length transfer price should reflect the total cost of 
the ranitidine, including the 6 per cent royalty paid to the parent 
company under the licence agreement, or just the cost of acquiring the 
ranitidine from Adechsa.206 The Tax Court rejected the relevance of 
the licence agreement, holding that a strict transaction-by-transaction 10 
approach was required under a comparable uncontrolled price 
method. 207  The supply agreement with Adescha and the licence 
agreement with the parent company covered separate matters and 
should be considered separately.208 The taxpayer’s comparators that 
included similar licence agreements with independent distributors 15 
were therefore invalid. 
The Tax Court’s exclusion of the licence agreement between 
the parent company and the taxpayer was overturned on appeal to the 
Federal Court of Appeal,209 and the Minister’s subsequent appeal to 
the Supreme Court was dismissed.210 The Supreme Court considered 20 
that an inquiry into an arm’s length price necessarily involved 
consideration of all the circumstances of the taxpayer that were 
relevant to the price paid to the supplier. 211  Such circumstances 
included agreements that conferred rights and benefits in addition to 
the purchase of property where those agreements were linked to the 25 
purchasing agreement.212 The Supreme Court remitted the case back 
to the Tax Court and made the point that “[t]he objective is to 
determine what an arm's length purchaser would pay for the property 
and the rights and benefits together where the rights and benefits are 
linked to the price paid for the property.”213 30 
The Supreme Court’s comment that the property, rights and 
benefits should be considered together exposes the fundamental 
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problem of applying the comparable uncontrolled price method to 
imperfectly competitive corporations.214 Such corporations are able to 
use an imperfectly competitive structure to generate economic 
profits.215 Economic profit is the residual of revenue less opportunity 
costs, where opportunity costs consist of the value of the returns from 5 
the next best alternatives foregone. 216  In the case of a distribution 
chain like that used by the Glaxo group, the economic profit is 
realised when the last link in the chain sells a product to an arm’s 
length purchaser. Market imperfections that generate economic profits 
can arise in several ways.217 The size of a multinational enterprise like 10 
the Glaxo group may induce economies of scale that produce cost 
savings through the production chain as output increases and average 
costs of production fall.218 Large firms with global networks may also 
have information advantages over other market participants allowing 
them to better manufacture and distribute products. An imperfectly 15 
competitive firm may also be able to control prices in a market, 
forcing other market participants to exit or preventing others from 
entering. The parent company’s licence agreement with the taxpayer is 
a specific example of a market imperfection in the form of an 
intangible asset that generates an economic profit. The licence 20 
agreement confers on the taxpayer the right to distribute a valuable 
branded product, Zantac. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the 
taxpayer has the exclusive right in the anti-ulcer treatment market to 
distribute Zantac and that Zantac is a superior product, the demand for 
the taxpayer’s Zantac products will increase. 219  The demand for 25 
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generic substitutes will not. The Glaxo group's global sales revenues 
increase and so too do its economic (and accounting) profits. 
The Supreme Court's decision allows the economic profit 
arising from the licence agreement to be included in the taxable 
income of the taxpayer. On one hand the court's decision is to be 5 
welcomed. The economic profit is capable of being included in the 
taxable income of the taxpayer whether the Glaxo group chooses to 
repatriate the economic profit in the form of a royalty to Glaxo Group 
or a higher transfer price paid to Adecha. The problem, though, is that 
it is difficult to determine whether the economic profit in the form of 10 
either the royalty or higher transfer price is attributable solely to the 
licence agreement or to other market imperfections. As was explained 
above, economic profits can be generated in a number of ways. If the 
economic profit is generated exclusively from the licence agreement 
then the taxpayer's reliance on comparators that feature similar licence 15 
agreements seems valid. But if the economic profit is generated from a 
range of different market imperfections that are unconnected with the 
licence agreement, then the reliance on similar licence agreements as 
comparators is questionable. 
The Glaxo series of decisions show the difficulties in trying to 20 
include the economic profit in the taxable income of the firm where 
those profits are generated from a range of different market 
imperfections. The economic profit that the taxpayer sought to find 
comparable arm’s length data for could have been attributable to the 
licence agreement. But equally, it could also have been attributable to 25 
the economies of scale of the Glaxo group, its market power, or its 
competitive information advantages in drug manufacturing and 
distributing. More generally, in many cases under the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, there will be no comparable transactions 
between unrelated parties that reflect the precise economic profits 30 
made by the imperfectly competitive firm in question.220 Multinational 
enterprises by their very nature generate synergies and economic 
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profits that entities trading at arm’s length do not. 221  Comparable 
arm’s length profits may simply not exist. 
The range of arm’s length methods in the OECD guidelines is in 
effect a concession from the OECD that multinational enterprises 
operate in unique circumstances to which there may be few 5 
comparable transactions. 222  It is therefore unsurprising that some 
states’ transfer pricing rules permit tax authorities to prefer profit-
based methods over traditional transactional ones. Rather than being 
restricted to calculating an arm’s length price on the basis of 
comparable transactions, profit-methods allow tax authorities to 10 
calculate arm’s length profits on the basis of financial ratios. The use 
of profit methods like in National Semiconductor overcomes, to some 
extent, the difficulties in identifying reliable comparable pricing data 
under traditional transactional methods. 
The theoretical shortcomings of the arm’s length principle, 15 
particularly in relation to the comparable price method, provide a 
sound explanation for the divergence that has occurred from the OECD 
transfer pricing regime. Even countries whose transfer pricing rules 
show a high degree of convergence with OECD policy have expressed 
concerns about the current international framework. The United 20 
Kingdom Select Committee on Economic Affairs notes that:223 
We agree that fundamental reform of the international tax 
framework should be pursued in the OECD. As things stand, there 
are too many opportunities for multinational companies to 
manipulate their affairs to reduce their global tax payments. 25 
Corporate manipulation of the system so as to avoid taxation 
reduces governments’ revenues, undermines public trust in the tax 
system. We recommend that the Government should continue to 
play its full part in encouraging the OECD’s reform agenda to an 
early successful conclusion. At the same time the Government— 30 
and the Treasury review we propose—should explore the scope 
for more radical alternative approaches to corporate tax. 
The OECD has itself acknowledged as much. In 2013 the OECD 
released its findings on the extent of tax revenue losses from tax 
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planning behaviour by multinational enterprises.224 The OECD report 
noted that “the international common principles drawn from national 
experiences to share tax jurisdiction may not have kept pace with the 
changing business environment”225 and that “it is also important to 
revisit some of the fundamentals of the existing standards.”226 The 5 
report found a “perception among governments that … the domestic 
and international [OECD] rules on the taxation of cross-border profits 
are now broken and that taxes are only paid by the naïve.” 227 
According to the report, civil society, news media outlets and non-
governmental organisations have been pointing to transfer pricing 10 
rules as the cause of corporate profit shifting and tax avoidance.228 
The OECD has not shied from these criticisms. It accepts that the 
transfer pricing guidelines may be putting too much emphasis on legal 
structures rather than on the underlying reality of the economically 
integrated group, and that such an emphasis may be contributing to 15 
cross-border profit shifting. 229  The OECD already has proposals 
underway to simplify and update its transfer pricing guidelines.230 
C  A Fair Share of Tax 
A final obstacle to harmonisation and another reason for the 
divergence in transfer pricing rules is the desire by governments to 20 
combat tax base erosion from profit shifting. The desire stems from 
the perception that multinational enterprises are not paying a fair share 
of tax. 231  This essay does not attempt to conclude whether the 
perception that multinationals are not paying a fair share of tax is 
correct, nor does it attempt to point out what a fair share constitutes. It 25 
is enough to point out that such a perception exists, and that it 
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influences the extent to which governments adhere to the OECD 
transfer pricing framework. 
It is often the case that the interests of multinationals conflict 
with the interests of governments.232 In microeconomic theory it is 
assumed that an integrated multinational enterprise acts in order to 5 
maximise global profits net of tariffs and taxes.233 Businesses have an 
interest in the efficient management of operations in order to 
maximise profits. Governments have a political responsibility to 
administer the affairs of the state. Governments introduce taxes in 
order to fund the provision of state services. Multinationals operate 10 
within a business environment that is regulated to varying degrees by 
the state, and multinationals pursue their goals of profit maximisation 
within these constraints.234 Transfer price manipulation is a method of 
evading the state-imposed constraints on business activity. Rugman 
and Eden suggest that whether multinationals are economically 15 
successful in maximising profit through transfer pricing is an 
unresolved question. 235  In any case, it is the perception that 
multinationals have the power to shift profits that matters. 236 
Governments view transfer pricing with suspicion and attempt to 
prevent price manipulation that leads to profit shifting.237 20 
Cross-border profit shifting, or at least the suspicion of it, is 
giving governments a good reason to use arm’s length methods that 
yield higher tax results, even if it means diverging from the priority of 
methods in the OECD guidelines. Some commentators suggest that the 
OECD transfer pricing rules constrain the ability of governments to tax 25 
multinational enterprises effectively.238 If the principle had remained 
as a general one:239 
 … it could have been interpreted flexibly through case-law, and 
could have evolved into appropriate profit apportionment 
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methodologies. Regrettably, the OECD officials have been allowed 
to go their own way, free from any parliamentary scrutiny, and 
develop the increasingly complex and inappropriate Guidelines. 
Part III showed that jurisdictions such as Australia and the 
United States have preferred to adopt a more flexible approach to the 5 
arm’s length principle in order to obviate the constraints of the OECD 
guidelines. The end goal has been to secure more appropriate returns 
from multinational activities in their respective jurisdictions.240 There 
is some evidence that multinational enterprises are benefiting from 
profit shifting at the expense of national tax revenue. Between 2005 10 
and 2007 Australia has lost €1.1 billion in tax revenue to the European 
Union.241 Over the same period the United States has lost USD 1.5 
billion in tax revenue to other jurisdictions. 242  Whether this is the 
result of transfer price manipulation or other forms of tax planning is 
difficult to prove. The OECD tentatively suggests that data on foreign 15 
direct investments may indicate the existence of profit shifting from 
high tax jurisdictions to low ones. For example, in 2010 Barbados, 
Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands combined received more 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (5.11 per cent) than 
Germany or Japan. In the same year these three jurisdictions invested 20 
more into the world (4.54 per cent) than Germany.243 That evidence 
does not necessarily imply the existence of transfer pricing 
manipulation.  
Whatever the policy reasons for doing so, and whatever the 
evidential basis for it, multinational enterprises are the subject of 25 
increasing scrutiny by tax authorities. Concepts of fairness may be the 
underlying rationale for closer scrutiny. But, as a former director of 
tax policy at the OECD warns, fairness is not the only criterion by 
which to judge multinational enterprises. 244  If governments are 
dissatisfied with the outcomes under existing OECD transfer pricing 30 
rules, then they must go about changing them. 245 In the meantime 
governments will continue to apply the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines in a flexible fashion to achieve a fair return from 
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multinational enterprises. Given that fairness is an inherently 
subjective notion, it can be expected that arm’s length results will 
continue to be arrived at using methods in ways that diverge from the 
OECD guidelines. As such, the harmonisation of transfer pricing rules 
will be difficult to achieve. 5 
D A Cause for Concern? 
The divergence in transfer pricing rules from OECD policy need 
not necessarily be a cause for concern. The OECD’s recommendation 
that member countries follow the transfer pricing guidelines is largely 
premised on the principle of certainty. It is axiomatic that certainty is 10 
a foundational principle in legal systems and an important element of 
the rule of law.246 Certainty of tax rules is desirable from a taxpayer’s 
perspective so that taxpayers can plan their transactions with 
foreknowledge of the possible consequences.247 The guidelines point 
out that certainty of arm’s length methods is desirable so that an arm’s 15 
length result is arrived at on the basis of the highest degree of 
comparable data available. 248  The guidelines also point out that 
certainty of arm’s lengths methods promotes harmonisation and 
reduces the risks of double taxation.249 In the language of the OECD, a 
major reason that the principle should be adopted is that it “provides a 20 
broad parity of tax treatment for members of [multinational enterprise] 
groups and independent enterprises.”250 
A notable exception to the principle of certainty in the law is 
the use of general anti-avoidance rules to combat tax avoidance 
activity. 251  Added to that exception should be the choice of arm’s 25 
length methods in ways that diverge from the OECD guidelines. States 
may choose between applying the principle in a certain fashion 
according to the priority of methods, and applying the principle in a 
way that most appropriately taxes the true economic substance of 
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profit even if it means that the choice of methodology will be 
uncertain. States are adopting the latter choice. 
General anti-avoidance rules depend on vagueness for their 
effectiveness, and so certainty may be an inappropriate value for such 
rules to strive for.252 Is certainty an inappropriate value for the arm’s 5 
length principle to strive for? The obstacles to transfer pricing 
harmonisation suggest that certainty in the choice of arm’s length 
method may not be appropriate. The uncertainty in the selection of 
transfer pricing methodology is justifiable on the basis that neither the 
principle nor the guidelines are legally binding on member states 10 
outside of domestic or treaty law. The principle may therefore be 
legitimately subject to permutation when incorporated into domestic 
legislation. 
The uncertainty is also justifiable on the basis that the 
principle does not reflect the economic reality that multinationals 15 
operate in. Comparable data on multinationals and independent parties 
in similar circumstances are difficult to find. In the absence of 
comparable data, tax authorities have little choice but to apply profit-
based arm’s length methods in ways that resemble formulary 
apportionment. If a rigid principle and strict priority of methods did 20 
not provide any flexibility to overcome the problems in finding 
comparable data, then tax authorities would face considerable 
difficulty in taxing the activities of multinationals. The shortcomings 
of the arm’s length principle and the OECD guidelines make a 
departure from certainty a necessary remedy. 25 
V Conclusion 
The thesis of this essay is that the complete harmonisation of 
transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length principle is unattainable. 
Harmonisation is unattainable for three main reasons. First, the arm’s 
length principle relies on incorporation into either domestic law or 30 
treaty law for binding legal effect. Even after being transformed from 
a non-binding principle to a legal rule, the interpretation of the 
principle in a consistent fashion is dependent on tax authorities 
adhering to the OECD guidelines. The OECD guidelines are themselves 
seldom given the force of law in domestic legislation. Tax authorities 35 
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and courts are therefore free to interpret domestic arm’s length 
provisions in ways that may diverge from the arm’s length results 
contemplated in the OECD guidelines. Transfer pricing legislation in 
the United States and in Australia is illustrative of the point. In those 
jurisdictions, tax authorities may use profit-based methods to calculate 5 
arm’s length results in situations where the OECD guidelines require 
the application of traditional transactional methods. 
Second, states are compelled to prefer profit-based methods 
over traditional transactional ones due to theoretical shortcomings in 
the separate entity approach. Multinationals generate economic profits 10 
from the existence of market imperfections and their unique integrated 
structure. There is often very little comparable data available that 
show how independent parties would have transacted in similar 
circumstances to related parties. The difficulties from a lack of 
information are exacerbated when the transactions in question concern 15 
payments for intangibles. It is difficult to identify the market 
imperfections that are generating a multinational’s economic profit. 
The market imperfections may arise from a multinational’s use of 
intangible assets, like a licence agreement. But they might also arise 
from other aspects of a multinational’s structure. Without knowing 20 
what feature of the multinational enterprise is the cause of an 
economic profit, the search for comparable data becomes exceedingly 
futile. As a result, tax authorities defer to the use of profit-based 
methods to overcome the paucity of comparable pricing data. 
Third, governments have formed a perception (rightly or 25 
wrongly) that multinationals are not paying a fair share of tax. One of 
the causes of this perception is the fundamental interest of a 
multinational in maximising global after-tax profits. Another cause is 
that the 2010 OECD transfer pricing rules place too much emphasis on 
rules, rather than on the economic substance of profit that should be 30 
subject to tax. The two causes are leading governments to provide 
their tax authorities with more flexibility when applying the arm’s 
length principle (as is already evident in Australia and the United 
States). A necessary consequence of flexible approaches to the arm’s 
length principle is that transfer pricing rules will inevitably diverge 35 
across different jurisdictions. 
The combined effect of these three obstacles is that the 
complete harmonisation of transfer pricing rules with the arm’s length 
49 
principle is unattainable. The obstacles have resulted in a divergence 
from the OECD transfer pricing framework. Such divergence is not 
wholesale, because any approach to transfer pricing is still informed 
by an overarching principle. Harmonisation may be attainable if 
consensus is reached on what the most appropriate way to apply the 5 
arm’s length principle should be. The 2010 guidelines do not reflect 
such a consensus, but future guidelines may do so. Indeed, in 2013 the 
OECD began work on fashioning a new consensus on the application of 
the principle. That work may be the beginning of a more successful 
process of transfer pricing harmonisation. 10 
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